Gedo has long served as a useful barometer for the health of relations between Nairobi, Mogadishu, and Addis. Straddling the tri-border Mandera Triangle, the Mareehaan-dominated region of Jubaland has been a key staging post for Al-Shabaab's continued infiltration into Kenya and Ethiopia for years. And as such, both Nairobi and Addis have a vested stake in Jubaland as a security buffer zone against the jihadists, developing close ties with key political actors within Gedo and the southern Federal Member State-- which they helped co-establish in 2013. Over a decade later, with Hassan Sheikh Mohamud back at the helm in Mogadishu, the focus has returned to Gedo, as he has resorted to a well-known destabilising playbook by attempting —and failing —to wrest the Mareehaan into Villa Somalia's orbit. But amid the government's months-long campaign to destabilise Gedo, including seizing Garbahaarey and Luuq from control of Jubaland to carve out Darood tents for its rigged elections, Addis has remained silent-- until now.
It is now official: Somalia’s National Security Adviser (NSA) Hussein Sheikh Ali, aka “Hussein Ma’alin’ has stepped down. On his X (formerly Twitter) handle, Hussein described himself as “former” NSA. On Sunday evening, the Office of the Prime Minister put out a short statement to say Mukhtar Mohammed Hassan has been appointed acting National Security Adviser. Mukhtar is not well-known and the assumption of many is that he will be a placeholder until a suitable replacement is found. Both Hussein and Villa Somalia remain reticent in explaining what exactly happened and why the changes are being made.
In December 2023, the final elements of the UN Security Council sanctions regime were lifted on the Somali federal government. Mogadishu's celebrations were rapturous, with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud declaring that Mogadishu could now "purchase any weapons needed" and that "friendly nations and allies" could hand over the "necessary weapons without any limitations or restrictions." After years of lobbying, the final albatross around the neck of the federal government was to be lifted, and the Somali National Army (SNA) handed the heavy firepower required to conquer Al-Shabaab once and for all. Of course, over 18 months on, quite the reverse has happened, with Al-Shabaab having swept across much of central Somalia since February-- despite the glut of Egyptian and Turkish weapons donated to Villa Somalia in the past year. And Puntland's seizure of the MV Sea World, a Comorian-flagged vessel carrying Turkish arms and armoured vehicles last week, has thrown the question of the lifting of the arms embargo back into the open.
In just a handful of days, Sabiid in Lower Shabelle has fallen back to Al-Shabaab, Turkish arms linked to government-aligned arms traffickers were seized off Puntland's coast, and armed clashes erupted in Beledhawo in Gedo between Jubaland and federal troops. With the immediate threat of Mogadishu falling to Al-Shabaab having passed for the time being, Villa Somalia has returned to its favoured agenda, wielding its security apparatus not against the jihadists but against political opposition. Subsequent violence in Gedo, Sanaag, and the collapse of the Lower Shabelle operations are all emblematic of Villa Somalia reverting to its coercive tactics to attempt to forcibly impose its will on the peripheries. But it is losing-- and badly, having entirely failed to learn the lessons of Ras Kamboni in December 2024 when federal troops were routed by Jubaland.
Never, in the history of Somalia's contemporary governance, has so much political goodwill, both domestic and international, been squandered by anyone as President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has done in the past 12 months. In the early morning hours of 16 May 2022, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (HSM) was elected as the 10th President of Somalia, marking his second term, following his first from 2012 to 2017. Optimism was high, partly due to his previous experience as president and partly because of the deep unpopularity of his predecessor, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, with many relieved that the incumbent had been defeated. However, just over three years later, the outlook in Somalia remains unrelentingly bleak due to HSM's destabilising political agenda.
Somalia remains heavily-dependent on external aid to fund humanitarian and development projects and plug a huge budget deficit to keep the federal state functioning. In 2025, 67% of Somalia's USD 1.32 billion federal budget was funded by external donors. In 2022, Somalia received over USD 2.2 billion in humanitarian assistance, according to figures released by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – a record high by sub-Saharan standards, but still far below the requirements with climate change distress and armed conflicts continuing to aggravate living conditions for millions of Somalis.
The loss of Moqokori and Tardo – both ma'awiisley strongholds – in the past week has been a symbolic defeat for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). After being won from the insurgents nearly three years earlier by the ma'awiisley – local clan militias raised by communities in Hiiraan and adjacent Middle Shabelle - the loss of these towns is not simply another military setback; it starkly reveals a major political and strategic failure by the FGS. The grassroots Hawaadle clan fighters who held the frontline have been effectively abandoned as Mogadishu quietly shifted focus away from empowering these local forces, sacrificing their local capacity in favour of the Somali National Army (SNA), which is neither capable nor professional, ceding the initiative back to Al-Shabaab.
Hospitals and health clinics are generally not targeted deliberately in armed conflict because a belligerent could lose international credibility immediately and be liable for prosecution under the International Humanitarian Law. In recent years, as armed conflicts have surged and the fog of war rendered any reporting hard to verify, hospitals are increasingly becoming targets in themselves.
Another week, and the federal government's destabilising antics have threatened to tip yet more of the country into open conflict. Never mind Al-Shabaab seizing Mokoqori in Hiiraan and routing the Hawaadle ma'awiisley, Villa Somalia's attention remains trained on pressing ahead with its unilateral one-person, one-vote (OPOV) agenda. In recent months, an increasingly central plank of this has become SSC-Khaatumo, the Dhulbahante-dominated administration in the contested Sool region, with its interim president Abdikhadir Ahmed Aw-Ali 'Firdhiye' a prominent member of the new Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP). In exchange, an unconstitutional federal member state-formation process has been accelerated, attempting to 'merge' Sool-based SSC-Khaatumo with a fringe group from the Warsangeli-majority Sanaag region, similarly claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland
In recent years, an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the nuances of autism has emerged across much of the world. Advanced ways of identifying and supporting those with neurodivergence have materialised, particularly in education and in the job market. That has not been the case in Somalia, however, even though medical studies have revealed disproportionately high diagnosis rates amongst Somali children in some Western countries. Instead, traditional Somali understandings of mental health and neurodivergence continue to operate in a rigid binary, centred around the concept of waali (insanity). Within Somali culture, there is limited room for developmental or neurological differences that do not fall within these expectations of either psychosis or normalcy.
After months of climbing tensions, Somalia's federal government and the so-called 'national opposition' are now tentatively engaged in dialogue. Last week, the second round of talks took place at Villa Somalia, with renewed hope for a breakthrough on a roadmap for the federal elections scheduled for May 2026. Meanwhile, the newly established National Dialogue Forum should further help diminish the potential for violence on the streets of Mogadishu. Yet, the bonhomie between President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the coalition Somali Salvation Forum (SSF), led by former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, cannot mask the fact that the road ahead will be fraught with hurdles as Villa Somalia continues to press ahead with its destabilising electoral agenda.
This week, Somaliland President Abdirahman 'Irro' travelled to Qatar for what was billed as a "historic visit," the first sitting leader of the unrecognised polity to be received in Doha. It certainly proved historic, but unlikely in the way that the Waddani administration hoped for, with the Qatari PM and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani springing a chastening press release following their meeting. The last lines of the Qatari PM's statement were particularly toe-curling for Hargeisa, asserting that "Qatar's belief that Somalia's future is built through openness and constructive communication among all its components, to ensure respect for the sovereignty and national unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia." Though the Somaliland government has tried to brush it off, it may prove a wake-up call for the complexities of navigating relations with Doha and others.
Every Thursday, Somalis can tune into Radio Andalus, an Al-Shabaab-affiliated radio station, to listen in to a jihadist commander wax lyrical about their upbringing and commitment to the cause. In one such recent interview with Al-Shabaab's appointed Banaadir Governor, Muse Abdi Arraale, he recounts his life, having grown up in Hargeisa before joining Waxda Al-Shabaab Al-Islamiyya (Islamic Youth Unity group) as a teenager and being imprisoned by the Siad Barre regime. Explicitly tying himself to groups beyond Al-Qaeda proper, such interviews represent an attempt to both position these extremist commanders in Somalia's Islamist history as well as humanise them. Increasingly tapping into discourses of Somali nationalism, Al-Shabaab's prolific propaganda output remains among the most sophisticated of any insurgent group. The London-based Tech Against Terrorism, which monitors extremist online content, assesses that Al-Shabaab is "the largest single producer of terrorist material on the internet."
Somalia's Al-Shabaab jihadist armed insurrection has entered its 18th year with no let-up in violence or any sign the conflict is close to a resolution. Indeed, Al-Shabaab is resurgent and remains as lethal as ever, having displayed its continued prowess after sweeping across much of central Somalia in its Ramadan offensive-- and beyond-- earlier this year. But what allows Al-Shabaab to thrive is not solely the ability to project military power or deploy intimidatory violence, but also the often under-reported, extensive and insidious rent-seeking and control of local economies as well.
"We still get men walking up to us and telling us that it's against our culture and religion to try and be men. But we are not trying to be men, you see. We are simply standing up for ourselves as women and asking to be allowed rights which already rightfully belong to us." Zainab Hassan, a Somali women's activist. In the 1970s, Somalia was widely regarded as a kind of cultural Mecca, with 'Swinging Mogadishu' at its heart. Dhaanto music provided a soundtrack to the decade in the country's modern cultural golden age, and one where women were particularly prominent. Plays, music, and art flourished privately and under the state's support, with nightclubs and bars dotted throughout the capital in which men and women mingled freely. The term 'MogaDisco' is sometimes ascribed to the eclectic mix of Somali disco, reggae, soul and funk that was popularised in these years. Tragically, much of this unique Somali cultural identity-- and women's prominent role in it-- has been expunged, a result of the perennial insecurity and hardline Salafist influence in the decades since.
Strolling through Galkacyo in Puntland and Kismaayo in Jubaland in the early 1990s, it was not uncommon to see young Somalis wearing t-shirts adorned with 'Galkacyo and Kismaayo are free' or words to a similar effect. Amid the rampaging forces of General Mohamed Farrah Aidid in central Somalia, the t-shirts neatly encapsulated a sentiment of broader pan-Darood solidarity at a moment of intense political instability and armed conflict in the Hawiye-dominated centre of the country. As Mark Twain once said, 'History doesn't repeat itself, but it does often rhyme,' and the warming ties between Jubaland and Puntland over thirty years later in opposition to Mogadishu have echoes of the early days of the civil war amidst the broader strained Hawiye-Darood relations today.
Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) in Somalia has long been a politically fraught and contested process. With more guns than people and dozens of militias operating outside any formal chain of command, DDR presents one of the more pressing stabilisation challenges. While Somalia’s federal government struggles to establish a modicum of control over its own weapons and ammunition, and the international community has invested countless millions trying to disarm and demobilise Somalia’s armed factions from the top down with little success, Somaliland and Puntland demonstrate that effective demobilisation and sustainable peace are possible if they are locally driven and preceded by a political settlement.
The ongoing Ugandan-led 'Operation Silent Storm' to dislodge Al-Shabaab from three key bridge towns in Lower Shabelle represents essentially a rehash of the 'Operation Badbaado' (Salvation) campaign, conducted between 2019 and 2020. Coming after the Al-Shabaab Ramadan offensive earlier this year that routed Somali National Army (SNA) positions across Lower and Middle Shabelle, Operation Silent Storm marks the first concerted effort to dislodge the jihadists from their advanced positions toward Mogadishu. And while much has already been made of the intense fighting at Sabiid by Villa Somalia, in reality, the operations are limited in scope and appear likely to repeat the mistakes of its predecessors, even if it disrupts a route for the jihadists into Mogadishu. Re-establishing a string of bunkered Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Awdheegle, Bariire, and Sabiid manned by a hollowed-out and demoralised SNA will not turn the tide against Al-Shabaab.
The ongoing Ugandan-led 'Operation Silent Storm' to dislodge Al-Shabaab from three key bridge towns in Lower Shabelle represents essentially a rehash of the 'Operation Badbaado' (Salvation) campaign, conducted between 2019 and 2020. Coming after the Al-Shabaab Ramadan offensive earlier this year that routed Somali National Army (SNA) positions across Lower and Middle Shabelle, Operation Silent Storm marks the first concerted effort to dislodge the jihadists from their advanced positions toward Mogadishu. And while much has already been made of the intense fighting at Sabiid by Villa Somalia, in reality, the operations are limited in scope and appear likely to repeat the mistakes of its predecessors, even if it disrupts a route for the jihadists into Mogadishu. Re-establishing a string of bunkered Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Awdheegle, Bariire, and Sabiid manned by a hollowed-out and demoralised SNA will not turn the tide against Al-Shabaab.
Since the collapse of the Somali state in the 1990s, the country's private sector has played a particularly prominent role in service delivery, flourishing in the cracks left by the absence of a central government. In this space of the ungoverned economy, those providing essential utilities — such as healthcare — were assumed by businesses and economic cartels, which have reaped immense profits in turn amid the vacuum. However, in the years since, as the state-building process has gradually attempted to deliver or centralise such services, the incestuous relationships between business cartels and rent-seeking politicians have persisted. And in the meantime, the fractured and uneven nature of healthcare providers in Somalia continues to pose severe dangers to the population.