Ethiopia is fast approaching another grim anniversary-- two years of the Fano insurgency in the Amhara region, an armed conflict that shows no sign of abating and that has exacted a savage humanitarian toll. In August 2023, a disparate collection of former militiamen from the Tigray war, former Amhara Special Forces, and disgruntled farmers under the banner of 'Fano' militias escalated their operations, attacking and seizing government buildings and military posts in the Amhara region. In the preceding months, the government had sought to suppress elements of their former allies, seeking to arrest and disarm the varied movement with prominent strains of Amhara nationalism, but to no avail. And in the two years since Fano fighters briefly seized Lalibela on 1 August 2023, much of the Amhara region has witnessed a near-total breakdown in governance and law and order, with several thousand killed and many tens of thousands displaced.
In a triumphant parliamentary address at the beginning of July, Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed announced that the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) was finally complete. After well over a decade and USD 4.2 billion spent, GERD is the largest hydroelectric dam on the continent– stretching over a mile wide and 140 metres high in Ethiopia's western Benishangul-Gumuz region on the Blue Nile tributary. And with preparations underway for a likely lavish official inauguration in September, Abiy also took the opportunity to invite the leaders of downstream Egypt and Sudan. Striking a conciliatory tone, Abiy pledged that "the Renaissance Dam is not a threat, but a shared opportunity" and asserted "Egypt's Aswan Dam has never lost a single litre of water due to the GERD."
Healthcare workers across Ethiopia launched unprecedented strikes in 2025, bringing an already fragile system to its knees. Beginning mid-May, over 15 ,000 doctors, nurses and other health workers across the country conducted a strike to protest chronic low wages and deteriorating working conditions. By late May, the strikes had spread nationwide, paralysing whatever was left of the public hospitals and clinics.
In mid-June, a highly choreographed show of bonhomie was organised at the Mereb Bridge in Tigray, which connects Ethiopia's northernmost region to Eritrea. Waving Eritrean and Tigrayan flags, communities seemingly came together in an attempt to display a buried hatchet at the local level, over two years on from the calamitous war that left hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans dead. These bizarre images, rather than reflecting any genuine move towards reconciliation or justice and accountability, are instead part of the deepening ties between the dominant faction within the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in Mekelle and Asmara. Behind the warming relations, however, are eerie similarities with the current rhetoric of Mekelle, Addis, and Asmara, and that of the months leading up to November 2020 and the outbreak of war.
With national elections anticipated in Ethiopia in 2026 and the country facing immense turmoil, it is worth considering how they might shape up. While a year is plenty of time, there is little to currently suggest that they will be free, fair, or open, but instead-- much like their predecessors-- a highly choreographed affair that can imbue little to no legitimacy on the ruling Prosperity Party. Instead, internal armed conflict, shrunken democratic space, and the ongoing throes of state contraction are all highly likely to frustrate the democratic will of the Ethiopian people. And despite an appearance of contestation that may be permitted at the ballot box itself, the possibilities of genuine political alternation will be virtually none, with PM Abiy Ahmed having cemented his grip on power since the last set of polls in 2021.
On 26 April 1937, the Spanish town of Guernica was reduced to rubble by German Luftwaffe bombers. Conducted in support of Franco's nationalist troops, the bombing marked a turning point in modern warfare, where civilians were considered no longer collateral damage — they were targets. A few weeks later, Pablo Picasso transformed the event into an enduring visual outcry: Guernica, a monumental black-and-white painting that captured the agony of civilians crushed beneath impersonal, mechanised violence. Nearly a century later, under a different sky — that of northern Ethiopia — the weapons have changed. Drones now replace planes, and the devastation they inflict is quieter, remote-controlled, but no less lethal. Today, the war is waged by algorithms, and yet the bodies are still real.
To much fanfare, Oromia's regional President Shimelis Abdisa and a breakaway faction of the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) agreed upon a 'peace deal' in early December 2024. At the time, Addis hailed the agreement as further proof of itself as a peacemaker, both nationally and for the Oromo people, no matter that fighting continued to rage across much of western and southern Oromia. But with its abysmal track record of adhering to domestic peace agreements, optimism was low that the accord marked a genuine turning point in the enduring conflict in Oromia rather than being another cynical attempt to splinter the Oromo political and armed opposition. Six months on, all evidence would suggest the latter, with the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of surrendered OLA fighters in particular having been reneged upon.
The factionalism that has defined Tigray's regional politics in recent months shows no sign of easing. With Getachew Reda having been ousted as Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) president in March, his replacement—Lt. Gen. Tadesse Werede—has inherited a hornet's nest of competing interests, with Addis and Asmara both dangerously seeking to ingratiate themselves amidst the looming threat of conflict. While the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) has successfully re-established its monopoly on the politics of Ethiopia's northernmost region, questions regarding the return of displaced persons, the resolution of the occupation of Western Tigray, and the party's participation in future elections remain unresolved-- and intensifying.
Last week, it was reported that landlocked Ethiopia-- with Russian assistance-- was nearing completion of a glittering new complex to house the country's naval headquarters. Constructed in Addis over three hectares at seemingly vast expense, the building personifies a kind of 'Potemkin Village,' the fake construct designed to mislead outsiders into believing in something more impressive than its reality. It appears set to play a central role in the ongoing ambition of the federal government to restore vaguely-worded Ethiopian 'access' to the sea, which may yet involve the invasion of Eritrea, as well as the supposed beautification of the capital.
Ethiopia’s Cycle of Violence Spins On In October 2023, in its final report, the UN's International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) urged the international community to redouble its efforts to protect civilians and hold perpetrators "accountable" for the "staggering" human rights abuses that had been carried out in Ethiopia. Eighteen months later, these calls have gone entirely unheeded, while the Commission's warning that there is "no deterrence for future atrocity crimes" has borne fruit in a number of conflict-riddled regions of the country. It was a severe error to bow to pressure for the ICHREE to close prematurely-- leaving it unable to form a determination on the question of genocide in Tigray-- and one that has let down past and future victims of breaches of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Ethiopia
ONLF Eyes Armed Struggle as Peace Falters Addis's national strategy of divide and conquer towards legitimate political opposition is pushing the Somali Regional State (SRS) to the brink of renewed conflict. Months of escalating tensions between the SRS administration led by Mustafa Mohammed Omar 'Agjar' and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) have taken another dangerous turn in recent days. Yet another attempt to remove the ONLF Chairman Abdirahman Maaday underhandedly appears to have definitively pushed the former insurgents towards a return to armed mobilisation, imperilling nearly 7 years of fragile peace in the SRS.
The 'Original Sin' of the Pretoria agreement In late October 2022, Tigrayan and Ethiopian federal representatives met in Pretoria, South Africa, under the auspices of the African Union, amidst the raging Tigray war. Back-door US diplomacy in Djibouti and the Seychelles in mid-2022 had failed to produce anything of note, and brutal fighting had renewed in late August. Calculating they could no longer bear such devastating human costs—costs Addis and Asmara seemed willing to absorb—the Tigrayan delegation arrived in Pretoria ready to make peace and reluctantly accepted terms far from ideal.
While international attention has been trained on the political schism within Tigray and the drumbeat of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Fano insurgency in the Amhara region has escalated further. On 19 March, several of the most prominent Fano militias launched "Operation Unity" in the Amhara region, targeting dozens of Ethiopian military installations and inflicting significant casualties. The attack across Gojjam, Gondar, and Wollo demonstrated a previously unseen level of coordination between these Fano factions.
Since the beginning of March, the destabilising schism within and between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) has rapidly escalated. The TPLF faction, led by Debretsion Gebremichael and backed by the majority of the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) leadership, has now consolidated its hold on central and north-eastern Tigray and moved to assert itself over key towns, including Adigrat and parts of Mekelle. Amid the broader strains, this appears to have triggered the departure of TIA President Getachew Reda from Tigray for Addis, possibly ending his fraught time as regional leader. While the possibility of armed intra-Tigrayan conflict remains unlikely for now, the concerning backdrop of escalating Addis-Asmara tensions threatens to plunge the broader region into renewed conflict. On 10 March, TIA Vice-President General Tsadkan Gebretensae publicly warned of a return to war.
Renewed conflict may be looming in Ethiopia's Somali region. Having given up arms in 2018, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) has warned that it is considering a return to insurgency after months of deteriorating relations with the federal government. Last week, ONLF Chairman Abdikarim Sheikh Mahdi 'Maaday' confirmed that the party was exploring all eventualities in light of Addis's refusal to implement key articles of the 2018 peace agreement. The risk of a return to conflict had been apparent for some time, with the ONLF voicing increasing frustration at its own marginalisation as well as perceived infringements on the Somali Regional State's (SRS) independence and rights.
Between 19-22 February, several major Oromo opposition parties met in Addis to discuss Oromia's sustained upheaval, including the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) insurgency. For several years now, the region has been gripped by still-worsening humanitarian, political, and security crises, while the regional opposition has been essentially co-opted into the government or splintered and unable to mount a response to the deteriorating situation. In this light, the two principal Oromo opposition parties-- the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC)-- met in Addis alongside representatives from the ruling Prosperity Party and Oromo civil society actors.
Reports from Ethiopia's western Gambella region suggest a sudden resurgence in cross-border cattle raids from the Murle ethnic group of South Sudan. Communities on either side of the porous border have long wrestled with cyclical cattle invasions, which are a particularly prominent feature of South Sudan's Jonglei region's profound instability. While the recent attack was the first cross-border raid since mid-2023, it is emblematic of the contraction of the Ethiopian state and the bleeding of instability across the Horn of Africa.
On 9 February, during a press briefing in Addis, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva called on Ethiopia to unite behind the government's economic reform agenda. Buoyed by the progress made by Addis, she said that the "reform Ethiopia has embraced is tough and takes time, but it will yield tremendous results." So far, these reforms– including the rapid liberalisation of the economy– have caused significant financial reverberations amid a period of widespread internal conflicts and rapid state contraction.
Since the beginning of the year, the schism within and between the two factions of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) has continued to deepen. The two groups-- led respectively by TPLF Chairman Debretsion Gebremichael and TIA President Getachew Reda-- have dug in despite multiple mediation attempts.
Since its inception, Brigade N'Hamedu, also known as the 'Blue Revolution,' has focused on targeting the pro-Eritrean regime's cultural festivals-- long used to fundraise, intimidate potential opposition, and serve as propaganda tools. While Brigade N'Hamedu is not Eritrea's first diaspora-based opposition movement to challenge these notorious events, its scale and scope have set it apart from previous efforts. The movement gained particular momentum toward the end of 2022, with protests aimed at exposing and resisting the transnational and domestic repression orchestrated by the Eritrean regime and its diaspora institutions garnering significant attention.